Abstract-To evaluate loan applicants, banks increasingly use credit scoring models. The objective of such models typically is to minimize default rates or the number of incorrectly classified loans. Thereby they fail to take into account that loans are multiperiod contracts, for which reason it is important for banks not only to know if but also when a loan will default. In this paper a bivariate tobit model with a variable censoring threshold and sample selection effects is estimated for (1) the decision to provide a loan or not and (2) the survival time of granted loans. The model proves to be an effective tool to separate applicants with short and with long survival times. The bank's loan provision process is shown to be inefficient: loans are granted in a way that conflicts with both default risk minimization and survival time maximization. There is thus no trade-off between higher default risk and higher return in the lending policy.
I. Introduction
C ONSUMER credit has come to play an increasingly important role as an instrument in the financial planning of households. When current income falls below a household's permanent level and assets are either not available or not accessible for dissaving, credit is a means to maintain consumption at a level that is consistent with permanent income. People expecting a permanent increase in their income but lacking any assets, such as students, have a desire to maintain consumption at a higher level than their current income allows. Borrowing can assist them in doing that. Those who accumulate funds in a pension scheme but are unable to get access to them when they experience a temporary drop in current income can also increase their welfare by bridging the temporary fall in income with a loan.
The quantitative importance of consumer credit may be illustrated by the fact that total lending, excluding residential loans, by banks and finance companies to Swedish households amounted to SEK 310 billion (199 billion), or SEK 34, 779 (22, 494) per capita, by the end of 2001 (1996) . That is equivalent to 13.7% (10.9%) of Swedish GNP, or 28.1% (22.3%) of total private consumption. Viewed from the perspective of financial institutions, household credit also constitutes a significant part of their activities, making up 34.3% (36%) of total lending to the public. If one includes residential loans, which are often granted by separate subsidiaries, in total lending, this figure drops to 15.5% (12.8%). When looking at the risk involved in these loans instead of their volume, their importance is even greater. Current Bank for International Settlements (BIS) rules stipulate an 8% capital requirement on consumer credit, compared to, for example, 4% on residential loans.
From these numbers, it should be clear that a lending institution's decision to grant a loan or not and its choice of a specific loan size can greatly affect households' ability to smooth consumption over time, and thereby their welfare. At a more aggregate level, consumer credit makes up a significant part of financial institutions' assets, and the effects of any loan losses on lending capacity will be passed through to other sectors of the economy that rely on borrowing from the financial sector. For this reason, the properties and efficiency of banks' credit-granting process are of interest not merely because the factors determining the optimal size of financial contracts can be examined. At least as important are the implications these contracts have for the welfare of households and the stability of financial markets.
The starting point of every loan is the application. When lending institutions receive an application for a loan, the process by which it is evaluated and its degree of sophistication can vary greatly. Most continue to use rather naive, subjective evaluation procedures, such as a nonformalized analysis of an applicant's personal characteristics or scoring with integer numbers on these characteristics. Some banks, however, use a statistical credit-scoring model to distinguish loan applicants who are expected to pay back their debts from those who are likely to fall into arrears or go bankrupt.
By far the most commonly used methods are discriminant analysis and logistic regression. Altman et al. (1981) contains a good review of this literature. Both models have been fitted to distinguish good loans from bad ones among approved applications. The estimated parameters are thus subject to sample selection bias when these models are applied to all applicants. More recent studies have employed k-nearest-neighborhood (Henley & Hand, 1996) and count data (Dionne, Artís, & Guillén, 1996) models, classification trees, and neural networks (Arminger, Enache, & Bonne, 1997) . These methods tend to suffer from problems with either the calibration, the estimation, or the interpretation of their parameters, in addition to the sample selection bias mentioned earlier. All of them also fail to take account of the multiperiod character of an optimal debt contract and the implications this has for the credit-granting decision.
In financial markets with perfect information, any optimal multiperiod financial contract can be obtained by a sequence of 1-period loan agreements (Townsend, 1982) . Loan applicants will be willing to pay the competitive interest rate that corresponds to their idiosyncratic risk and will choose a first-best loan size. Under asymmetric information things become more intricate. In the literature that studies credit markets and the form of optimal financial contracts in the presence of adverse selection or costly state verification, credit rationing-the unequal treatment of ex ante equal people-is a recurring phenomenon. See for example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) or Williamson (1987) . When rationing is the mechanism that equilibrates credit markets, some applicants will be excluded from credit despite being as creditworthy as those granted a loan. The allocation of resources will thus be inefficient.
Let us assume that single-period agreements are optimal 1 and that only the probability of default is unobservable to the lender. Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that the optimal 1-period debt contract consists of a pair (l, ) where l is the size of the loan and the level of the endowment shock below which the debtor will be declared bankrupt. Under these circumstances traditional credit-scoring models-by enabling a lending institution to rank potential customers according to their default risk-could improve the allocation of resources, from a second-best toward the first-best equilibrium. In a more general context, however, this does not solve a lender's profit maximization problem, because financial contracts typically stretch out over several time periods. Townsend (1982) proves that, in the presence of asymmetric information between the borrower and lender, ex ante optimal contracts can only be created by multiperiod debt contracts because they allow payoffs to be dependent on past and present behavior of the borrower.
A loan, being a multiperiod contract, generates a flow of funds until it either is paid off or defaults, in which case a part of the principal may still be recovered. The net present value of a loan is thus not determined by whether it is paid off in full or not, but-if it is not-by the duration of the repayments, amortization scheme, collection costs, and possible collateral value. It may, for example, still be profitable to provide a loan, even if the lender is certain that it will default. Because the goal of financial institutions is to maximize profit (or utility), not to rank potential customers according to default risk, credit-scoring models leave much room for subjective factors in the loan approval process. In a sense, banks use statistical models to forecast bankruptcy, but-conditional on this forecast-resort to ad hoc methods to predict profitability. Shumway (2001) partially remedies this shortcoming by estimating a simple hazard model of survival time, but ignores the sample selection effect. Boyes, Hoffman, and Low (1989) address this deficiency and investigate if the provision of credit currently takes place in an efficient way. For this purpose they estimate a bivariate probit model with two sequential events as the dependent variables: the lender's decision to grant the loan or not, and-conditional on the loan having been provided-the borrower's ability to pay it off or not. If the lending institution is minimizing credit risk, one ought to find opposite signs for the parameter of one particular explanatory variable in the two equations. This would imply that variables that increase the probability of a positive granting decision also decrease the likelihood of a default, and vice versa. Boyes et al. find, however , that variables like duration of job tenure, education, and credit card ownership carried the same signs, indicative of a policy that conflicts with default risk minimization. As I noted earlier, lenders may nevertheless prefer such a policy of supplying loans with a higher default risk because they have a higher expected rate of return (either the interest rate is higher or the default is expected to occur after a long period with regular installments and interest payments). Moreover, Boyes et al. show that unexplained tendencies to extend credit are positively correlated with default frequencies-another fact consistent with a policy that trades off default risk against profitability.
This paper deals with two issues. First, in order to improve upon the currently available methods for evaluating loan applications, I construct and estimate a tobit model with sample selection effects and variable censoring thresholds. This model can be used to predict the expected survival time on a loan to any potential applicant. Using the predicted survival time allows banks to make a more realistic evaluation of the return on a (potential) loan than when they merely employ an estimate of the default risk associated with an individual-as a traditional credit-scoring model does. 2 Secondly, I take up the question of the efficiency of banks' loan provision process that is raised by the results in Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) and Boyes et al. (1989) . The latter suggest that the fact that some variables increase the probability of a positive granting decision while at the same time increasing the likelihood of a default is a consequence of profit-maximizing behavior by the lender. Here, it will be investigated if a similar relationship continues to exist when one models the survival time of a loan instead of the probability of its default. If variables that increase the likelihood of an applicant obtaining a loan also increase the expected survival and vice versa, then this will constitute further evidence of banks' behaving in a way that is consistent with profit maximization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data set and its sources. In section III, I derive the econometric model. Section IV contains the empirical results, and section V concludes the paper with a discussion of the results and possibilities for future research.
II. Data
The data set consists of 13,337 applications for loans that were processed by a major Swedish lending institution between September 1994 and August 1995. All applications were submitted in stores where potential customers applied for instant credit to finance the purchase of a consumer good. Out of the 13,337 applications, 6,899 were rejected and 6,438 were approved. The data set includes 127 second attempts by individuals who had applied once before.
The evaluation of each application took place in the following way. First, the store phoned the lending institution to get an approval or a rejection. The lending institution then analyzed the applicant with the help of a database with personal characteristics and credit variables, to which it has online access. The database is maintained by Upplysningscentralen AB (hereafter UC), the leading Swedish credit bureau, which is jointly owned by all Swedish banks and lending institutions. If approval was given, the store's salesman filled out a loan contract and submitted it to the lending institution. The loan is revolving and administered by the lending institution like any other credit facility. It is provided in the form of a credit card that can only be used in a specific store. Some fixed minimum payment by the borrower is required during each month. However, because the loan is revolving, it has no predetermined maturity. Earnings on the loan come from three sources: a one-time fee paid by the customer, a payment by the store that is related to the total amount of loans granted through it, and interest on the balance outstanding on the card. There is no annual fee, either for the store or for credit recipients. For this study, the lending institution provided a data file with the personal number of each applicant, the date on which the application was submitted, the size of the loan that was granted, the status of each loan (good or bad) on October 9, 1996, and the date on which bad loans gained this status.
Although one can think of several different definitions of a "bad" loan, I classify a loan as bad once it is forwarded to a debt-collecting agency. I do not study what factors determine the differences in loss rates, if any, among bad loans. An alternative definition of a bad loan could have been one for which the borrower has received one, two, or three reminders because of delayed payment. However, unlike forwarding to debt-collecting agency, one, two, and three reminders were all transient states in the register of the financial institution. Once customers returned to the agreedupon repayment scheme, the number of reminders was reset to zero. Such a property is rather undesirable if one needs to determine unambiguously which observations are censored and which are not. UC provided the information that was available on each applicant at the time of application and that the financial institution accessed for its evaluation.
By exploiting the personal number that each resident of Sweden has, the credit bureau was able to merge these two data sets. In Sweden, each person is assigned a unique 10-digit personal number at birth or at immigration. The first six digits consist of the year, month and day of birth, and the remaining four indicate, among other things, gender and (foreign) citizenship. The personal number is used for a variety of purposes, like employment, taxes, social security matters, bank accounts, loans, and rental registration. An employer, for example, needs to register its employees by their personal number to deposit payroll taxes, and a bank requires the personal number to open a bank accountamong other things, so as to be able to pay base rate capital income taxes to the tax authorities. Typically, tax authorities store data on a number of variables that are relevant for determining tax rates, such as marital status, the city of residence, several income components, and real estate and other assets (exceeding the tax-exempt amount).
The Swedish Freedom of the Press Act entitles not only Swedish residents but even aliens to read all official government documents. Examples of public documents are letters written to and by a government institution, but also tax forms and job applications at government institutions. Only drafts of documents, unless filed or sent out by the authority, and individual documents that are classified as secret under the Secrecy Act, are exempt from this entitlement. Every individual or company can thus access and process personal income statements and the accompanying personal information. However, without permission from the Swedish Data Inspection Board (SDIB), data from different sources cannot be merged or stored for more than some predetermined time period. Government authorities can, for example, compare social security payments with income tax data. But unless a bank or credit agency obtains an exemption from the SDIB, it may only store data on payment remarks for up to 3 years.
For the purpose of this study the personal numbers were removed before handing over the data set. Overall, the database includes a total of 49 variables (approximately 60 after transforming qualitative variables into dummies). A full list is provided in table B2 in appendix B. The major part consists of publicly available, governmentally supplied information such as sex, citizenship, marital status, postal code, taxable income, taxable wealth, and house ownership. The remaining variables, such as the total number of inquiries made about an individual, the number of unsecured loans, and the total amount of unsecured loans, are reported to UC by the Swedish banks. Table 1 contains definitions and descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables that are used in the analysis in section IV. Of the applicants, 6,899, or 51.7%, were refused credit. The remaining 6,438 obtained a loan ranging from 3,000 to 30,000 Swedish kronor (approximately U.S. $350-3,500). The lending institution's policy was that no loans exceeding 30,000 kronor were supplied. Although there is an indicated amortization scheme, the loans have no fixed maturity-they are revolving.
On October 9, 1996, all people in the sample were monitored by the lending institution. On that occasion 388 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 948 (6.0%) of those who had obtained a loan had defaulted and been forwarded to a debt collection agency. All other borrowers still fulfilled their minimum repayment obligations at that time. The survival time in the sample, calculated as the number of calendar days between the date of application and the date of default, ranged from 130 days (a defaulted loan) to 795 days (a censored observation). Descriptive statistics for survival time are provided in table 2.
III. Econometric Model
Under ideal conditions, evaluating loan applicants or studying efficiency in the provision of bank loans would entail modeling the revenue on each loan as a function of a set of personal characteristics and macroeconomic indicators. However, because few banks store complete time series of interest payments and amortizations on loans, the The table provides definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables and splits up the sample into rejected and granted applicants and further divides granted applicants into defaulted and still performing loans (N ϭ 13337). information presently available and useful for such a study is limited to the current balance and status (good or bad) of each loan. Therefore, I will instead model the survival time of each loan. With some simplifying assumptions imposed on the amortization scheme and cost structure, one can then in principle calculate an estimate of the return on each loan as a function of survival time.
The econometric model consists of two simultaneous equations: the first one for the binary decision to provide a loan or not, y i ; and the second one for the natural logarithm of survival time of a loan (in days), for notational simplicity denoted by t i . Because the bank from which I obtained the data merely considered whether it would accept an application or not, all people who were granted a loan received the amount of credit they applied for at the going rate of interest. The first equation therefore models a binary decision. I do not model how individuals determine the amount of credit they apply for.
I use the superscript * to indicate an unobserved variable and let y* i and t * i follow
where the disturbances are assumed to be homoskedastic and bivariate normally distributed:
As mentioned, y i is a binary choice variable that takes the value 1 if the loan was granted and 0 if the application was rejected:
For loans that turn bad, we can observe the exact survival time. For loans that are still performing on the day of monitoring, survival is censored because we do not know if and when they will turn bad. Because all loans were monitored on October 9, 1996, but were granted anywhere between September 1994 and August 1995, the good loans' survival times will be censored at varying thresholds. For example, a loan granted on September 1, 1994, has a censoring threshold of 768 days. For a loan granted on August 31, 1995, it is 434 days. A loan's censoring threshold for survival time will be denoted as t i . The above can be summarized in the following censoring rule:
Because one only observes survivals for loans that are actually granted, there is not only a censoring rule for t i , but also an observation rule, as shown in table 3.
A dummy variable d i splits up the sample of granted loans into good ones and bad ones. If a loan's survival is uncensored (t* i Յ t i ), it must be a defaulted one; if its survival is censored, it must be a good one:
Because three types of observations exist-no loans, bad loans with survival t i , and good loans with survival t i -the likelihood function will take the following form: (1) and (2)- (5) and table 3, equation
In appendix A.1 it is shown that equation (7) implies the following log likelihood:
where ⌽ (⅐) and ⌽ 2 ( ⅐ , ⅐ , ) represent the univariate and bivariate standard normal c.d.f., the latter with correlation coefficient . 
Entries in the 2ϫ2 table show pairs (yi, ti) that are observed for all ranges of y * i and t * i.
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IV. Empirical Results
Because no theoretical framework exists to help select candidate explanatory variables from the full data set, the following three-step procedure was applied. First, correlations between all relevant variables were calculated to check for potential multicollinearity problems. When a set of variables were highly correlated with each other, I checked for their univariate explanatory power in predicting the probability of obtaining a loan and the probability of default. As a rule, out of each set the variable with the highest correlation with either event was selected for the third (estimation) stage. In addition, plots against empirical default and granting probabilities were studied to investigate the monotonicity of the (univariate) relationship. In the first two stages, most of the income and tax variables were consequently eliminated. As mentioned in section II, the original data set contained many different income components, both gross and net of taxes, plus many tax variables. Moreover, for a fair number of these income and tax measures two subsequent annual observations were available. Correlations within both the group of income variables and the group of tax variables-both simultaneous and lagged-were generally high and often around or above 0.9. In a similar way, BALANCE was eliminated in favor of LIMIT.
In the third stage the candidate variables were used to estimate equation (8). In principle, all possible model permutations were estimated and the model with the best properties was selected. Criteria that were used for this purpose were the t-statistics, likelihood value, number of parameters, and model stability. Some of the candidate variables were omitted from the final model because they were insignificant in both equations for every permutation of the bivariate tobit model. Age, citizenship (Swedish, Nordic, non-Nordic), the number of months since immigration (and some transformations), the combined value of all real estate a person has (partial) ownership in, shop and chain dummies, and BALANCE/INCOME were removed for this reason.
It is also worthwhile to make some remarks on the distribution of survival time. QQ normality plots, which compare the sample survival-time distribution with a normal distribution having equal mean and variance, suggest that a logarithmized transformation increases the symmetry of the survival-time distribution slightly. In addition, the actual (uncensored) survival time is likely to display large outliers, which can be handled better by a log transformation. 3 The parameters of equation (8) are estimated by the following procedure. First, I calculate starting values for ␤ 1 from a univariate probit on the first equation in (1). These are consistent although not efficient, because the covariation between ε 1 and ε 2 is not taken into account. The starting values for ␤ 2 and 2 come from a tobit model with a variable censoring threshold on the survival time of the granted loans. This model implicitly assumes that ϭ 0. Under the restriction that ϭ 0, one can estimate the second equation in (1) separately. Because one ignores the rejected loan applications, these parameter estimates suffer from a sample selection bias and are inconsistent if 0-which is the case here, as we will see below. In all tests of the the model with simulated data, however, these estimates were found to be close to the true parameter values. The iterative procedure on the full model with sample selection converged rather easily when using these estimates as starting values. By comparison, when I let either an OLS or a Heckman two-step procedure generate the starting values for ␤ 2 and 2 -thus taking the sample selection effect into account while ignoring the censoring in t i -it was more time-consuming or even impossible to find a maximum for the log-likelihood function (8).
With these starting values, and letting start ϭ 0, I then estimate ␤ 2 , 2 , and simultaneously by maximizing equation (8) under the restriction that ␤ 1 ϭ ␤ 1 probit . These estimates of ␤ 2 , 2 , and are consistent and are in their turn used as starting values in the last step. Estimating ␤ 2 , 2 , and first and then estimating ␤ 2 , 2 , , and ␤ 1 by fullinformation maximum likelihood (FIML) saves a lot of time compared to doing FIML directly. The FIML iterations provide consistent and efficient estimators of ␤ 1 , ␤ 2 , 2 , and and a consistent estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. The FIML parameter estimates and their standard errors and t-statistics are presented in table 4.
The first two columns of table 4 contain two sets of parameter estimates for the loan-granting decision: the first from estimation as a single equation, and the second from estimation together with the survival equation. There appears to be no clear gain in efficiency in the estimate of ␤ 1 from estimating the two equations in (1) simultaneously. LOANSIZE could not be used as an explanatory variable in this equation, because no data on this variable were available for rejected applications. The effect of most variables on the probability of obtaining a loan is in line with our expectations. INCOME and HOUSE are confirmed in their role as important factors that contribute positively, whereas LIMIT, LIMUTIL, and DIVORCE have the traditional negative effects. The coefficients on MARRIED, DIFINC, and CAPINC are less intuitive, however.
The third and fourth columns of table 4 compare two different estimators of ␤ 2 and 2 . The parameter estimates in the third column are obtained from a tobit model with a variable censoring threshold that ignores the sample selection effect that arises from disregarding the rejected loan applications. This is equivalent to estimating ␤ 2 and 2 in equation (1) under the hypothesis that ϭ 0. One is, in other words, assuming that the likelihood of a survival of a certain length is not affected in any systematic way by the inferences one can make from observing y i and x 1i . If the hypothesis is true, then the parameters in the first and second equation in (1) can be estimated separately from each other. However, if the disturbances ε 1 and ε 2 are correlated, these estimators of ␤ 2 and 2 will be biased. The fourth column in table 4 contains the consistent parameters estimates of ␤ 2 and 2 obtained by estimating the complete model (1)-(5). The purpose of comparing these two estimators is to investigate to what extent any misunderstandings about the relation between people's characteristics and financial discipline may have originated in an incorrect way of sampling data by financial institutions. A comparison of the two estimators will help us to determine if inconsistencies in bank lending policy find their origin in a sample selection bias. If there is any such sample selection bias, we will also want to find out whether it is also quantitatively important.
In the final model, all explanatory variables enter the model linearly. I have checked for the presence of nonlinear effects by adding quadratic terms in all continuous variables. Their coefficients were never significant, however. Out of 16 explanatory variables, four lose or reduce their significance and three turn significant or increase their significance on disregarding the sample selection effect. Of the parameters for the remaining nine variables, four are insignificant; the remaining five are significant and have identical signs in both models. So although allowing for the sample selection effect never reverses the sign of any of the coefficients, it does clearly affect their magnitudes. The influence of the variable ZEROLIM, for example, would be badly overestimated if one did not allow for the sample selection effect.
A look at table 1 may help us understand this phenomenon. Although having no loans outstanding is rather uncommon among the granted loans, it appears to be associated with defaulting rather than with proper repayment behavior. However, this overlooks the fact that 15% of all rejected applicants did not have any previous loan. If rejected applications are not very different from approved ones, then the actual effect of having a zero limit may well be much smaller than one would expect by merely looking at granted loans. 4 Similarly, INCOME is not significant in the (third) column with biased estimators, whereas the consistent parameter estimate in column four is significant and negative. Although one should be careful not to rationalize each counterintuitive finding, we can look for a tentative explanation. Table 4 (columns 1-2) and table 1 (columns 1-3) clearly show that people with higher incomes are more likely to be granted a loan and that people who are granted loans on average have higher incomes. Consequently, disregarding the rejected applicants (who have low incomes) could well have led us to infer that income does not influence a loan's default risk (within the subsample of accepted applicants), as table 4 (column 3) suggests. Moreover, if in fact other factors than INCOME determine a loan's survival, then the selection of applicants may be taking place on the basis of a negative bivariate relation between INCOME and defaults (see table 1) that will Univariate estimators of ␤1 and ␤2 come from separate estimation of the first and the second equation in (1), respectively, so that ϭ 0 is assumed. Bivariate estimators come from joint estimation of both equations in (1), so that the sample selection effect is taken into account and estimation of is required. The bivariate probit estimator ␣2 results when the second equation instead measures default risk. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Variables significant at a significance level of at least 10% are printed in bold. Observe that the log-likelihood value for the bivariate estimations refers to both equations jointly. disappear in a multivariate setting when one controls for both the sample selection effect and the correlation with other variables. In our sample people with higher income actually turn out to constitute a bigger risk than people with lower incomes, as columns 4 and 5 of table 4 show.
Other variables of interest that have significant coefficients are NRQUEST, ZEROLIM, NRLOANS, LIMIT, and LIMUTIL. The number of information requests is considered to reflect a person's efforts to obtain additional credit and thus is expected to contribute negatively to survival. Not having any loan at all, as indicated by ZEROLIM, is a sign of inexperience with servicing debt and has a negative effect on survival. For debtors or applicants with a loan, NRLOANS and LIMIT are considered to proxy for experience with servicing debt, and thus to increase the survival time. LIMUTIL captures the extent to which a debtor uses the available credit lines and decreases survival.
The value of the correlation coefficient (Ϫ0.98) is also worthy of comment. That value may create the impression that the algorithm had problems converging. In extensive tests of the model with different sets of explanatory variables and varying sample sizes, took values between Ϫ0.55 and Ϫ0.98. In tests with the bivariate probit model, the final parameter estimates of which are reported in the last column of table 4, ranged from approximately Ϫ0.65 to Ϫ0.93. For the bivariate probit model Boyes et al. (1989) report Ϫ0.35, and Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) Ϫ0.92. As is the case with most models with limited dependent variables (see Bermann, 1993) , the computations for the tobit and probit models did not converge for some configurations of explanatory variables. When the computations broke down, divergence always took place after relatively few iterations, with breaking its constraint before any of the other parameters had stabilized around a final value. In the estimation of the final model, all parameters settled down around their final values rather quickly.
Overall, the above results clearly illustrate the importance of taking rejected applicants into account when analyzing survival behavior. Ignoring the sample selection effect in an analysis of the duration of loans leads to considerable biases in the parameter estimates. Even though the sign of parameters is never reversed when switching from a biased tobit model to one that takes the sample selection effect into account, some variables, like income, outstanding loans, and income from assets, would have appeared to be unrelated to survival time had one disregarded the sample selection effect; the importance of others, such as gender, metropolitan residency, and lacking experience with credit, would have been overestimated. Biases like these, and the resulting misunderstandings, may well give rise to inefficient lending policies at financial institutions.
In the last column of table 4, I present parameters of the bivariate probit model, as constructed by Boyes et al. (1989) but reestimated with the data used in this paper. 5 On studying the probit parameters that determine the probability of a loan not defaulting (␣ 2 ), we see that all variables except for one have the same sign as in ␤ 2 in the tobit model of logged survival time. 6 Variables that increase (decrease) the probability of a default thus also decrease (increase) the expected survival time of a loan. However, a number of variables, like MALE, DIVORCE, HOUSE, BIGCITY, and ENTREPR, that are significant in the loan-granting decision actually affect neither default risk nor survival, and on the other hand NRQUEST does have a significant effect on survival but doesn't play any role in the acceptance process. MARRIED, INCOME, DIFINC, CAPINC, and LIMIT have opposite signs in the loan-granting and no-default equations, implying that the bank uses these variables in such a way that they increase (decrease) the likelihood of a loan being granted although they in fact increase (decrease) the risk of default. Because all parameters but one in the survival equation have the same sign as the bivariate probit parameters, these variables also reduce (raise) expected survival and return on the loan. In other words: if the bank is not minimizing default risk in its loan-granting policy, it is not doing so because loans with higher default risk have longer expected survival times and therefore higher expected returns. 7 Moreover, the negative values of in table 4 indicate that any nonsystematic propensity to grant loans is associated with shorter survival times and higher default risk. This is consistent with the above observation that the bank does not appear to trade off risk against return. Rather, the loan-granting policy appears to be inefficient and contain nonsystematic components that are strongly negatively correlated with survival.
Unlike Boyes et al., I here control for the size of the loan when estimating ␣ 2 and ␤ 2 . As table 4 shows, neither default risk nor survival is affected by LOANSIZE. This has two implications. First, within the size range available for the loans studied here, more credit does not imply greater default risk, nor does it imply either shorter or longer survivals. Secondly, the equal parameter signs for ␣ 2 and ␤ 2 5 Note that the bivariate probit model implicitly assumes that loans that are still performing at the time of monitoring will not default later on.
6 CAPINC is significant in the survival time equation, but not in the probit equation of default risk. Otherwise, all variables with significant parameters in the survival equation (1) of the tobit model with sample selection also have significant coefficients in the equation for the probability that the loan doesn't default in the bivariate probit model. The reverse, however, does not hold. Because the main objective here is to develop and illustrate the properties of the bivariate tobit model, variables that would have been significant in a bivariate probit model but are not in the tobit model have been omitted. 7 It is possible that the expected return per loan does not increase with the expected survival time, for example because loans that survive stop paying interest or carry a smaller balance. Here, we can exclude the first possibility because of the bank's definition of default. As far as the second possibility is concerned, the return per krona will be affected by loan size only through any fixed costs that the bank incurs when handling existing loans. Because we do not dispose of data on these costs, we cannot determine here at what point a longer survival time will be associated with a lower return due to a concomitant reduction in loan size.
demonstrate that greater default risk is associated with shorter survival, not with longer survival as Boyes et al. suggest . Within this category of loans, riskier loans are thus very likely to have lower expected returns. 8 The lending institution that I study, however, always extended loans with size equal to the amount applied for-independent of the risk associated with the applicant-and thus did not trade off higher default risk against higher expected earnings (coming from bigger loans). Such behavior is compatible with neither return or survival-time maximization nor default risk minimization, as the lending institution can increase its earnings by granting bigger loans without increasing their riskiness. One explanation could be that the bank attempts to maximize some other objective function than the rate of return on its loan portfolio, such as the number of customers, the lending volume subject to a minimum return constraint, or total profits from a range of financial products. Any such alternative is, however, not in agreement with the practice reported to me by the lending institution that provided the data. Except for rejecting applicants that are too risky, the lending institution has no explicit policy. In fact, loan officers do not dispose of any information-either the (historical or expected) behavior, or the return on a loan, or the range of products that an applicant already obtains at the lending institution. Thus, although we cannot preclude the possibility that another economic explanation does exist for this apparently inefficient behavior, the big discrepancy between the loan-granting policy and loans' survival or default provides strong evidence that the lending institution was far from minimizing risk or maximizing return. 9 Ultimately, the practical importance of the sample selection bias will depend on the gain in efficiency one can achieve by using the bivariate tobit model (1)-(4), or, in other words, the model's ability to select the best candidate loans among a set of loan applicants. For this purpose, I compare the selection accuracy of the bivariate tobit model with that of two other models discussed above-the (unbiased) bivariate probit model of default, and the (biased) univariate tobit model of survival time-with that of a commonly used, directly related model that I didn't discuss: the (biased) univariate probit model of default. 10 The latter model's parameter estimates are displayed in table B1 in appendix B. To evaluate the model's accuracy, in table 5 I report seven indicators that shed light on the selective ability in a number of different dimensions.
First, I look at each model's ability to single out loans that actually defaulted, because the minimum a good model ought to be able to achieve is to identify ex post a large share of the defaulted loans as being among the riskiest applicants, when sorting all loan applications according to their predicted survival time E[t* i ͉ x 2i , ␤ 2 ] or probability of default E[PD* i ͉ x 2i , ␣ 2 ]. The first six rows of table 5 show that the bivariate models are significantly better at sifting The table presents a comparison of the in-sample selection accuracy of the survival time equation of the bivariate tobit and univariate tobit models displayed in table 4, the default risk equation of the bivariate probit model displayed in table 5, and a univariate probit model of default risk shown in appendix B. All statistics are based on the assumption that the financial institution will grant 6,438 loans, as in the sample. In the table (higher) quality refers to (longer) survival times for the tobit model and smaller probabilities of default for the probit model. Unbiasedness (biasedness) refers to the bivariate (univariate) model. out the defaults than the biased models, with the tobit models marginally outperforming the probit models. Of all defaults, 51% are ranked among the 10% with the shortest survival time; another 16% and 11% are in the second and third decile, and only 11% are considered to be among the best five deciles. Had the bank used this model to make its loan-granting decisions, then only about 10% of the actually defaulted debtors would have been given credit. This corresponds to 0.62% of the granted loans, compared with 6.03% in the sample portfolio. Although the biased tobit model does only marginally worse in terms of the share of defaults granted credit (0.68%), its performance is clearly poorer in the upper deciles. Of all defaults, 22% would have been identified as belonging to the least promising decile, with the successive deciles accounting for 28%, 17%, 12%, and 7%. If the bank, for example, chose to grant a larger share of its applicants credit using the biased tobit model, then its bad performance in the upper deciles would lead it to take more risk than necessary. The two probit models displayed in the last two columns have a selection accuracy that is in line with that of the tobit models.
The third and fourth blocks of table 5 confirm our intuition that using a biased model leads to both unnecessary risktaking and shorter survivals. Of the 6,438 applicants to whom the bank would grant credit with the help of the bivariate tobit model, only 82% would have been granted credit under the univariate model. For the probit models, this figure is 86%. Lines 10 to 19 in the table show that the biased models do quite well in identifying the very best applicants, but lose this ability when moving to the applicants in the middle deciles of the survival time and default risk distributions. The biased models would, for example, select only 65-70% of the applicants in the sixth decile-who would all have been accepted by the unbiased bank. Instead, the biased banks would grant loans to applicants in the second to fifth deciles, where default risk is much higher and expected survival times much shorter.
Being good at picking out actual defaults among granted loans is not enough, though, for the bivariate tobit model to pass the test. Another desirable property one would like the model to display is for it to also recognize differences in creditworthiness among applicants who were granted credit and did not default and among those were denied credit. The last three lines of table 5 show that the bivariate tobit model would allow the bank to select applicants with expected survival times that are more than 3 times longer than in the sample portfolio. Using the biased model would also result in a significant increase of survival time, but the rise would turn out 18% smaller. With the probit models one obtains a similar improvement. Using the bivariate probit model reduces the portfolio's average default risk by 85%, compared with 78% for the biased probit model.
The bivariate model is not only better than both the bank and the univariate model at sorting applicants according to their survival time; it is also relatively good at picking out the best ones: granted loans have a survival time that is 6.6 times as long as that of rejected applicants. In the sample portfolio, the granted applications actually had shorter expected survival times than the rejected ones did. The probit model also sorts applicants in a more efficient way than the bank. People who would be granted credit in a model-based portfolio have an average default risk that is only 7% of that of rejected applicants. In the bank's sample portfolio this figure is only 75%. These figures also confirm that survival time is not just a simple transformation of default risk. Though the bank at least succeeds in selecting applicants with on average lower default risk than those who are denied credit, it is not able to pick out applicants with longer survival times. The reason for this difference is that, although the debtors who have (already) defaulted in the sample portfolio often are those with the shortest expected survivals, big differences exist in the expected survival of rejected applicants and accepted applicants who have not defaulted (yet). 11
V. Discussion
Traditionally, the objective of credit-scoring models used by financial institutions is to minimize either default rates or the number of loans that are incorrectly classified as defaulted or nondefaulted. From a profit-or utilitymaximizing perspective, however, it is not only important to know if but also when a loan will default. Traditional credit-scoring models only predict default risk and therefore fail to take into account this multiperiod nature of loans contracts. To allow for a more realistic evaluation of the return on a loan, a tobit model with sample selection and variable censoring thresholds has been constructed and estimated in this paper. This model is shown to be a useful tool to predict the expected survival time on a loan to any kind of applicant. A comparison with a nested model that disregards rejected applications-as has been common in studies of creditworthiness-shows that ignoring the sample selection effect leads to a large bias in the parameter estimates and an inefficient lending policy.
From the empirical results we gain several insights. They confirm the findings in Boyes et al. that financial institutions' lending policies are not compatible with default risk minimization. At the same time, though, the results also conflict with the notion that the financial institution should be trading off higher default risk against higher returns. The lending policy does not favor people that survive longer and thus are likely to have higher rates of return. Firstly, some of the variables that increase (decrease) applicants' odds of 11 Note also that the tobit model basically implies a nonlinear weighting scheme. Observations with exceptionally short survival times get a larger weight in the estimation than defaulted loans do. It is therefore not unlikely that the selection accuracy of the tobit model relative to the probit model would increase were one to monitor the sample portfolio later on and reestimate the models. This could be caused by the fact that some still-performing loans will default later on. obtaining a loan reduce (raise) the expected survival time and thus the return on a loan and raise (reduce) the likelihood of a default. Secondly, the financial institution is found to be indifferent between loans of different sizes, given its expected survival time. There is thus no evidence of banks' behaving in a way that is consistent with profit maximization. This impression is strengthened by an analysis of the selection accuracy of the bivariate tobit model and a comparison with other frequently used models. Such an analysis shows that the bivariate tobit model has a greater ability to pick out future defaults and select applicants with longer survival times. The model also significantly reduces the riskiness compared to the sample portfolio and increases the average survival time. Whereas a bivariate probit model reduces default risk by up to 85%, the Tobit model increases the portfolio's average survival time by a factor of 2.
The lending behavior studied here is thus very likely to be a symptom of an inefficient lending policy. However, I cannot exclude the possibility that the financial institution is aiming at some other objective than profit maximization or default risk minimization-for example, a composite objective such as the return on a range of products or revenues from several sources of income. Banks may also be maximizing some other objective like provision income from the turnover on credit cards, the number of customers, or lending volume, subject to a minimum-return constraint. None of these suggestions agree, however, with the practices reported by the lending institution that provided the data. Rather, the results bear strong evidence of a lending institution that has attempted to minimize risk or maximize a simple return function, without success.
Censoring of data, as with the nondefaulted loans in the sample, increases the uncertainty in the parameter estimates of the survival function. Appropriate changes in sampling methods can improve their accuracy. A longer period of observation of the loans would reduce the regression error. Even better would be to set up an experiment where a predetermined number of applicants is granted a loan without consideration of their personal characteristics. If each loan is monitored at least at termination of the contract, then separate survival-time functions for good and bad loans can be estimated. An ideal model of bank profitability or bank efficiency will have to be built on time series data for fees, interest payments, and amortizations on loans, personal characteristics, macroeconomic indicators, and all costs involved.
APPENDIX A
Likelihood Function and Gradient
Likelihood Function
The likelihood function The parameters with respect to which we maximize lnl are ␤ 1 , ␣ 2 , lng2, and .
Gradients
The gradients corresponding to each observation in the above loglikelihood function are Greene (1993, p. 661 ) for a summary of results on the bivariate normal c.d.f. 13 A description of the delta method is provided in Greene (1993, p. 297) . In some of the iterations, I also made the additional transformation ϭ (exp x Ϫ 1)/(exp x ϩ 1) to assure that 0 Յ Յ 1. In those cases the gradient ‫ץ‬ ln l/‫ץ‬ needs to be multiplied by the term ‫‪x‬ץ/ץ‬ ϭ (2exp x)/(exp x ϩ1) 2 and the fourth diagonal element in ⌫ needs to be set equal to ‫.‪x‬ץ/ץ‬ Table B1 presents the parameter estimates for a probit model of default risk that disregards the sample selection effect. These parameter estimates are used to generate the results in the last column of table 5. To facilitate comparison with the bivariate probit parameter estimates, the latter have been copied from table 4. Table B2 contains a list of all variables in the original data set, from both the credit bureau and the financial institution.
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